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DISTINGUISHING "PEACEFUL" FROM "MILITARY" USES OF
ATOMIC ENERGY: SOME FACTS AND CONSIDERATIONSf
STEPHEN GoRovY*
Ever since the discovery of the means of releasing nuclear energy, one
of the most pressing exigencies of our time has been the establishment of
effective international controls to insure that the formidable power of
the atom will be used solely for the peaceful pursuits of mankind.
When general nuclear disarmament appeared to be an unattainable
goal under existing world conditions, Western policy makers decided to
focus on more limited objectives, such as the setting up of international
controls over the civilian applications of atomic energy; thereby they
hoped to make atomic industrial know-how widely available to less de-
veloped nations without simultaneously enhancing the chances of pro-
liferation of -nuclear weapons. The various international atomic control
systems which - as a result - 'have come into existence 'have been incor-
porated in a series of international bilateral accords as well as international
multilateral agreements such as those establishing the International Atomic
Energy Agency (IAEA), the European Atomic Energy Community (Eura-
tom) and the European Nuclear Energy Agency (ENEA) of the Organiza-
tion of European Economic Cooperation (OEEC), now known as the Or-
ganization of Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD).1
The problem of distinguishing "peaceful" from "military" uses in
the field of nuclear energy is of fundamental importance inasmuch as one
of the basic objectives of the above international control arrangements
has been to assure that nuclear materials earmarked for peaceful purposes
would not be diverted to military uses. 2
t This article is the outgrowth of a study and on-the-spot survey sponsored by the American
Society of International Law involving international procedures and techniques developed to
control the peaceful uses of atomic energy. The author gratefully acknowledges the generous sup-
port and counsel of the Society and its Advisory Group as well as the assistance received -
through personal interviews - from officials of the United States Government, the United
Nations and other international organizations concerned with the peaceful uses of atomic energy.
The text of the article which is an elaboration of the author's address presented before the 15th
Conference of the Inter-American Bar Association on April 10, 1967, in San Jos6, Costa Rica, ex-
presses the views of the author.
* Chairman of the Graduate Program of the School of Law and Professor of Law, University
of Mississippi School of Law.
I For a concise, comparative analysis of the various international control systems, see Gorove,
Controls Over Atoms-for-Peace: Some Facts and Implications for Nuclear Disarmament, 27
LA. L REV. 36 (1966).
2 So far as it can be ascertained there has been very little discussion, if any, in the literature
involving the problem of distinguishing "peaceful" from "military" uses in relation to atomic
energy. Most of the recent writings discussing similar distinctions pertain to other areas of the
law, particularly to space law. See, e.g., McDOUGAL, LASSWELL & VLASIc, LAW AND PUBMC
ORDER IN SPACE 395 ff. (1965), with an extensive listing of the relevant literature; see also
Meyer, Interpretation of the Term 'Peaceful' in the Light of the Space Treaty, paper presented
before the 19th Congress of the International Astronautical Federation, New York City, October
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To be sure, the word "military" or "nonpeaceful" within the context
of atomic energy, may refer to something more than just "atomic weapons"
or "atomic warfare." It may or may not include submarines, airplanes or
rockets propelled by atomic energy. It may or may not include nuclear
explosives or radioactive fallout. Where is the line to be drawn? Even
if the word "military" referred to the more restricted concept associated
with "atomic weapons," it would be necessary to include a definition of
that term which may, owing to its technical nature, be difficult to apply.
In addition, there is the problem of the meaning of the term "use." Does
this include the various phases of "research," "development," "produc-
tion," "testing," and "storage," or only actual application?
Just as it may be extremely difficult to determine the degree to which
the discovery or use of electricity, steam, or water power have contrib-
uted to peace or added to the horrors of warfare, it may be equally diffi-
cult if not impossible to determine whether the actual application of atomic
energy will or will not in a given situation -increase the military capabili-
ties of a nation. Thus, atomic energy for military purpose, as in the case
of U.S. atomic stockpiles, may serve as a deterrent to war and hence con-
tribute to peace, whereas nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, such as
atomic power plants providing electricity or atomic-propelled commercial
airplanes, may increase the military potential of a nation and hence have a
tremendous wartime significance. Similarly, it may be very hard to deter-
mine the line where peaceful pursuits or studies end, or shade off into
their military counterparts. Also, it may be difficult to determine the ex-
tent to which the assistance obtained from a foreign source releases the
recipient country's resources for a military program of its own.3
While there have been many attempts to define the concept of "mili-
tary purpose," 'no satisfactory definition has been achieved. However,
there have been some clues provided in a series of atomic bilateral agree-
ments, 4 in the security control system of the European Nuclear Energy
17, 1968 (mimeo.) For brief references to the problem with regard to atomic energy, see Gorove,
Humanizing the Atom: Establishment of the International Atomic Energy Agency, 3 N.Y.LF.
245 (1957); Gorove, The First Multinational Atomic Inspection and Control System at Work:
Euratom's Experience, 18 STAN. L. REv. 160 (1965); Gorove, Controls Over Atoms-for-Peace:
U.S. Bilateral Agreements with Other Nations, 4 COLUM. J. oF TRANSNAV'L L. 181 (1966);
Gorove, Controls Over Atoms-for-Peace: Some Facts and Implications for Nuclear Disarraament,
27 IA. L REV. 36 (1966); Gorove, The Inspection and Control System of the European Nu-
clear Energy Agency, 7 VA. J. IRT.' L 68 (1967); Gorove, Transferring U.S. Bilateral Safe-
guards to the International Atomic Energy Agency: The 'Umbrella' Agreements, 6 DuQ. U. L
REV. 1 (1967).
3 Gorove, Humanizing the Atom: Establishment of the International Atomic Energy Agency,
3 N.Y.L.F. 245 at 279 (1957).
4 For general discussions of the control provisions of atomic bilateral agreements between
nations, see Gorove, Controls Over Atoms-for-Peace: U.S. Bilateral Agreements with Other Na-
tions, 4 CoL.ur J. oF TRANSNAVL L. 181 (1966); Gorove, Controls over Atoms-for-Peace
Under Canadian Bilaterial Agreements with Other Nations, 42 DENvER L. C-irm J. 41 (1965);
Gorove, Safeguarding Atoms-for-Peace: U.K. Bilateral Agreements with Other Nations, 68 W.
VA. L REV. 263 (1966); Seaborg, Existing Arrangements for International Control of Varlike
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Agency (ENEA) of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and De-
velopment (OECD), 5 as well as in some discussions of the International
Atomic Energy Agency (JABA).°
Under a number of bilateral agreements concluded by the United
States with other nations the "research on or development of atomic
weapons, ' 7 as well as the disposition, utilization, design, and fabrication
of atomic weapons, has been regarded as a military use." On the other
hand, the entire field of health and safety relating to atomic energy has
been regarded as falling under the "peaceful" category. Similarly, infor-
mation on reactors, including reactor engineering and properties of reac-
tor materials and their specification, reactor components, overall design
and characteristics and operational techniques and performance of reac-
tors; geology, exploration techniques, chemistry of uranium and thorium,
properties of materials, technology of production and utilization of ma-
terials was regarded as -having "peaceful" rather than "military" connota-
tions.9
Between these two fairly delineated extremes, there has been a wide
area where the ultimate determination seems to have been dependent on
technological developments at a particular time. Thus, for instance, the
development of atomic submarines, ships, aircraft and certain package
power reactors has been regarded by some bilateral agreements as a "mili-
tary" endeavor until such time as these atomic devices would warrant
civilian applications.1° Essentially similar position was taken with regard
Mfatcrial-5: The United States Program of Bilateral Safeguards, 2 DISARMAMENT & ARMS CON-
TROL 442 (1964).
5A thoroughgoing account and assessment of ENEA's security control procedures may be
found in Gorove, The Inspection and Control System of the European Nuclear Energy Agency,
7 VA. J. INT'L L 68 (1967). For briefer, informative discussions see Huet, The O.E.E.C. Eu-
ropean Nuclear Energy Agency, 1 LAW AND ADMINISTRATION 180 (I- Marks ed. 1959);
Vignes, Le Systlme de Contrdle de S&uritj de l'Agence Europienne pour l'Energie Nucaire,
7 ANNUAIM FRANCAIS DE DROIT INTENATIONAL 555 (1961).
6 For historical background and general information on the IAEA, see Bechhoefer & Stein,
Atoms for Peace, 55 Mic L. REV. 747 (1957); Gorove, Humanizing the Atom: Establish-
ment of the International Atomic Energy Agency, 3 N.Y.LF. 245 (1957); Isenbergh, The Sta-
tute of the International Atomic Energy Agency, 1 LAw AND ADMINISTRATION 219 (Marks
ed. 1959); Stoessinger, Atoms for Peace: The International Atomic Energy Agency, ORGAN-
IMING PEACE IN THE NucLEAR AGE 117 (1959). For more recent discussion and appraisals
of the IAEA and its safeguards system, see Gorove, Afaintaining Order Through On-Site Inspec-
tion: Focus on the IAEA, 18 W. RES. L REV. 1525 (1967); Hall, The Safeguards Role of the In-
ternational Atomic Energy Agency, 2 DISARMAMENT & ARMS CONTROL 170 (1964); Szasz,
The Law of International Atomic Energy Safeguards, 1 REvuE BELGE DE DROrr Nrm-
NATIONAL 196 (1967); Willrich, Safeguarding Atoms for Peace, 60 AM. J. INTL. L 34 (1966).
7 See, e.g., Agreement between Turkey and the United States, June 10, 1955, [1955) 2
U.S.T. & O.LA. 2703, T.I.A.S. No. 3320, art. VII(B). For additional agreements, see Gorove,
Controls Over Atoms-for-Peace: US. Bilateral Agreements with Other Nations, 4 CoLuM. J.
o' TRANSNAT'L L 181 (1966).
8 See, e.g., the Agreement between Australia and the United States, June 22, 1956, [1957]
1 U.S.T. & O.I.A. 738, T.I.A.S. No. 3830, art. I(B); cf. art. I(A) and (E).
OSee, e.g., the Agreement between the United Kingdom and the United States, June 15,
1955, [1955) 2 U.S.T & O.A. 2709, T.I.A.S. No. 3321, art. 1(C) (ii).
Old art. 11(C) (a).
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to the design, construction and operation of specific production plants for
the separation of deuterium from other isotopes of hydrogen and for -the
separation of isotopes of any other element. The same applied to the de-
sign, construction and operation of facilities other than reactors capable of
producing significant quantities of isotopes by means of nuclear reac-
tion.n
Turning from the bilateral agreements to the ENEA Security Control
Convention, 12 under the latter the use of special fissionable materials in
weapons of war has been taken to mean use for a "military" purpose
whereas the use of such materials in reactors for the production of elec-
tricity and heat or for propulsion has been regarded as use for a "non-
military" purpose.'8 While the IAEA Statute' 4 gives no similar clue re-
garding the meaning of "military" purpose, it is of some interest to note
that the Statute aims not at "nonuse" for military purpose but at "nonuse
in the furtherance" of such purpose which seems to indicate that the
draftsmen favored a broader prohibition. It is of further interest that,
whereas the Statute of the IAEA aims to ensure "nonuse in the further-
ance" of any military purpose,15 the Statute of the ENEA ' purports to en-
sure "nonfurtherance."' 7 In other words, under the ENEA, the materials,
equipment and services are not supposed to further any military aim
whether or not they are actually "used" for this purpose. Despite this
clear distinction, its practical effect remains uncertain. On the one hand,
there is no definition of the word "use" in the IAEA safeguards system,
just as there is no circumscription of the term "furtherance." On the
"1 Id. art. II.
2 Organization for European Economic Co-operation, Convention on the Establishment of
a Security Control in the Field of Nuclear Energy, December 20, 1957. For a text of the Secur-
ity Control Convention, see 53 AM. J. INT'L. L 1018 (1959).
23At 17.
14 Statute of the International Atomic Energy Agency, July 29, 1957, [1957] 1 U.S.T 1093,
T.I.A.S. No. 3873, 276 U.N.T.S. 3 (hereinafter cited as IAXA Statute).
15 Art. III A.5 of the IAEA Statute reads:
"The Agency is authorized: ... To establish and administer safeguards designed to
ensure that special fissionable and other materials, services, equipment, facilities, and
information made available by the Agency or at its request or under its supervision
or control are not used in such a way as to further any military purpose; and to apply
safeguards, at the request of the parties, to any bilateral or multilateral arrangement
or, at the request of a State, to any of the State's activities in the field of atomic
energy."
'
6 See, Organization for European Economic Co-operation, Statute of the European Nu-
clear Energy Agency, December 20, 1957 (hereinafter cited as ENEA Statute). The text of the
ENEA Statute appears in 53 AM. J. INTL. L. 1012-18 (1959). On September 30, 1961, by
decision of the Council of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, the
ENEA Statute was maintained in the new organization when the Convention establishing the
OECD came into force on October 1, 1961.
'
T Art. 8(a) of the ENEA Statute reads: "A security control shall be established with a
view to ensuring that the operation of joint undertakings and the materials, equipment and
services made available by the Agency or under its supervision, shall not further any military
purpose."
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other hand, while the ENEA concept appears broader because of the ex-
clusion of certain applications from the concept of military purpose, in
actuality it probably is narrower. Whether or not it will remain so, will
depend on the implementation of the concepts both by the ENEA and the
IAEA in the future.18
Looking back in search for historical dues in some of the IAEA dis-
cussions, it may be recalled that at the time of the negotiation of the
Agency's Statute several views were advanced. According to one opinion
only the military applications of atomic explosion and the toxicity of radio-
active fallout would have constituted use in the furtherance of military
purpose."9 Thus, the use of nuclear fuel for the propulsion of a sub-
marine, airplane or missile, or the installation on a tanker of an engine
similar to those on atomic submarines would not have amounted to such
use. Another view was that the Agency's objective was not prevention
but only segregation; so long as military uses were dissociated from peace-
ful ones, the argument ran, the Agency was obliged to assist one without
being able to discourage the other. The point stressed was that, by as-
sisting peaceful applications, the Agency would indirectly make the mili-
tary programs easier to execute.20
Further discussions regarding problems of definition and interpretation
also came up at the time of establishing the Agency's safeguards system
which was to assure that certain designated items will not be used in such
a way as to further a "military" purpose:21 One of the views advanced
was in favor of defining the concept of military purpose since nondefini-
tion might leave a way out for states which wished to utilize the Agency's
assistance for military purpose. If the inspectors found that materials had
been diverted to military purpose, the argument ran, they would be in a
difficult position if those concerned argued that the term "military pur-
pose" had not even been defined. A contrary view stressed the point that
an inspector who discovered some irregularity would report it to a higher
authority, such as the Agency's Board of Governors, which would then
be responsible for deciding whether or not there had been a diversion to
military purposes. Thus, if an inspector found that, in a steel factory us-
ing radioisotopes supplied by the Agency to measure the thickness of steel-
plate, certain quantities of the plate produced were used in the housing
industry and others in the manufacture of military barges, it would be up
to the Board of Governors to make the relevant decision. At the end of
18 See Gorove, The Inspection and Control System of the European Nuclear Energy Agency,
7 VA. J. f_-T'L. L 68 at 74 (1967).
19 See Gorove, Humanizing the Atom: Establishment of the International Atomic Energy
Agency, 3 N.Y.LF. 245 at 279 (1957).
201AEA Doc. CS/OR. 26, 66-67 (1957).
21 The discussions were held at the time of the drafting of the Agency's Safeguards Document,
which embodied the principles and procedures governing the application of the Agency's first
comprehensive safeguards system. See, IAEA Docr INFCIRC/26 (1961).
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the discussions, the consensus was that, while the use of nuclear energy for
a "military purpose" would no doubt be broader than just the production
of military weapons, not much would be gained by seeking an exact def-
inition at the time. Too narrow a wording might hinder the Board of
Governors in discharging its obligations properly, while working out a
comprehensive and foolproof definition would be extremely difficult, if
not impossible. Therefore, it was considered wiser to postpone a defini-
tion until some future time when -there might be a kind of common law
on the subject, based on inspectors' reports and on the Board's decisions.
In the meantime, the Board would consider and decide on the doubtful
borderline cases as they arose, whether at the time of application for
Agency help, or at the time when instances of possible misuse might be
reported.
Even the cursory examples to which space has permitted allusion seem
to indicate that the determination of the dividing line between "peaceful"
and "military" use or purpose in relation to atomic energy is by no means
an easy task. First, it appears essential to assess the overall objective of
the particular control system, that is to determine whether or -not it aims
at preventing "use," "use in the furtherance," or just "furtherance" of a
military purpose. Next, it would seem necessary to clarify whether or not
all types of activities falling within each of these categories are to be pro-
hibited or only certain types. For instance, research or the use of informa-
tion helpful in the development of atomic weapons may not be regarded
so serious as the setting up of nuclear power plants, or the actual use of
nuclear materials for weapons' production. Manufacture of atomic ex-
plosives could in most circumstances be regarded as military use, unless
the preferred policy was to allow it in certain specified instances (e.g.,
small explosive power, negligible radioactivity, etc.).
Obviously there is a wide gamut of activities that the terms "use,"
"furtherance in the use," or just "furtherance" of a military purpose may
purport to cover. Each of these could be placed on an infinite line rang-
ing from activities which seem to constitute minimal dangers or threats of
deprivation to the community involved, to activities where the hazards
appear to be greatest in terms of potential value losses. Any choice re-
garding the precise placement of the dividing line between peaceful and
military use or purpose is above all a policy question which should be
determined after a clarification of community objectives, an evaluation of
the costs and threats to community values of the alternative solutions and
a consideration of relevant trend perspectives. Any policy judgment, how-
ever, would do well to keep in mind the lesson conveyed by the atomic
bilateral agreements, namely that something which has overwhelmingly
military connotations today, may have many peaceful uses tomorrow.
Hence, the distinction between "peaceful" and "military" uses of atomic
[Vol. 30
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energy is a relative one and as such, should be reevaluated from time to
time in the light of technological developments and innovations.
